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NOTES
A UNIFORM ANALYSIS FOR DUAL
MOTIVE DISCHARGES
NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.'
Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act' (NLRA) makes it
an unfair labor practice for an employer to affect membership in any labor
organization by "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment." s In the past, courts have interpreted
this section to require that two elements be proven to constitute a violation: (1)
there must be discrimination (disparate treatment); and (2) the discrimination
must have the improper effect of encouraging or discouraging union activities."
Usually section 8(a)(3) cases turn on whether the employer acted with an im-
proper motive.5 Motive is of pivotal importance because if improper motive
can be proved, it is easily inferred that the employee was discriminated against
on the basis of the employer's impermissible motive and that a discharge (or
any action adverse to the employee) based on such grounds would discourage
other workers from participation in union activities.6
Most section 8(a)(3) cases involve an employee discharge which the em-
ployee alleges was based on his participation in protected union activities.1 The
employer usually alleges a business justification for the dismissal.8 When both
claims have merit, the determination of whether there has been a violation
becomes difficult,9 especially in light of the courts' reluctance to interfere with
1. 103 S. Ct. 2469 (1983).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
3. Id. § 158(a)(3).
4. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 32 (1967); American
Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965); see also Mueller Brass Co. v.
NLRB, 544 F.2d 815, 819 (5th Cir. 1977) ("The essence of discrimination in violation
of section 8(a)(3) of the Act is in treating like cases differently.").
5. Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 33; American Ship, 380 U.S. at 311; NLRB v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287 (1965).
6. American Ship, 380 U.S. at 311.
7. See generally R. GORMAN, BASIc TEXT ON LABOR LAW (1976).
8. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1083-84 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899
(1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
9. Id.
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the employer's right to discipline his employees. 10 Such cases have been
termed "dual motive" discharge cases,"1 and it is to these types of cases that
the rule promulgated in the recent Supreme Court case of NLRB v. Transpor-
tation Management Corp. 2 is directed.1 3
Sam Santillo was a bus driver for the Transportation Management Cor-
poration. A week prior to his discharge, Santillo contacted the Teamsters
Union to find out about organizing his fellow drivers to join the union. He
distributed union authorization cards to the drivers. Subsequently, one of San-
tillo's supervisors was overheard making remarks evidencing hostility towards
Santillo's union involvement. Three days later, Santillo was fired.14
Santillo filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board
(Board), alleging that he had been discharged because of his union activities,
in violation of sections 8(a)(1) 15 and 8(a)(3).11 The General Counsel of the
Board issued a complaint and the matter was tried before an administrative
law judge (ALJ). 7 The ALJ found that the employer had an anti-union ani-
mus, that the discharge was motivated by a desire to discourage union activi-
ties, and that Santillo would not have been fired if not for his union activities.
These conclusions were based on findings that the employer had never taken
adverse personal action against an employee for such activities in the past, and
further, that in Santillo's case the employer had not issued any warnings or
10. See American Ship, 380 U.S. at 311; see also Textile Workers Union v.
Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1964) (employer may terminate his business
for non-discriminatory reasons); L'Eggs Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 1337, 1341(9th Cir. 1980) ("[E]mployer may discharge an employee for good cause, bad cause, or
no cause at all, without violating § 8(a)(3), as long as his motivation is not antiunion
discrimination and the discharge does not punish activities protected by the Act.").
11. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1084. Dual motive cases are to be distin-
guished from pretext cases. A pretext case is presented when the employer claims legit-
imate cause for his actions, but there is nothing to substantiate his claim. He offers a
legitimate but "pretextual" reason to cover up the real and illegal reason. For a more
detailed discussion of this distinction, see Kelly, Wright Line, A Division of Wright
Line, Inc., The Right Answer to the Wrong Question: A Review of Its Impact to Date,
14 PAC. L.J. 869 (1983).
12. 103 S. Ct. 2469 (1983).
13. Id. at 2472-73. The Transportation Management decision dealt with the
analysis developed for such cases in the NLRB's Wright Line decision. In Wright Line,
the Board stated that the Wright Line test would apply "in all cases alleging violation
of § 8(a)(3) or violations of § 8(a)(1) turning on employer motivation." 251 N.L.R.B.
at 1089 (emphasis added). Since cases considered solely under section 8(a)(1) rarely
turn on motivation, scienter not being a requirement in such cases, see NLRB v.
Burnup & Sims Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964), this Note will focus on violations of §
8(a)(3). For a discussion of the relationship between § 8(a)(1), (3) and which should
be applied in cases of overlap, see Oberer, The Scienter Factor in Sections 8(a)(1) and(3) of the Labor Act: Of Balancing, Hostile Motive, Dogs and Tails, 52 CORNELL L.Q.
491 (1967).
14. Transportation Management, 103 S. Ct. at 2474.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
16. 103 S. Ct. at 2471; see 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
17. 103 S. Ct. at 2471-72.
[Vol. 49
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DUAL MOTIVE DISCHARGES
reprimands before the discharge.1 8
The Board affirmed the AL's decision.19 Applying the test developed in
Wright Line,20 the Board found that the employer had failed to prove that it
would have discharged Santillo even if he had not been a union organizer.2'
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied enforcement
of the Board's order.22 The court relied on its earlier decision rejecting the
Board's Wright Line test insofar as that test placed the burden of persuasion
on the employer to show that he would have fired the employee regardless of
his protected activities. 23 The court remanded the case for a determination of
whether the General Counsel had proved by a preponderance of the evidence
that Santillo would not have been fired had it not been for his union activi-
ties.24 The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of conflicts among the
circuits over Wright Line.25
The Court upheld the Board's Wright Line decision and concluded that
the First Circuit had erred in refusing to enforce the Board order.26 In so
holding, the Court endorsed the two-part motive analysis advanced in the
Board's Wright Line decision. Under this analysis, the General Counsel has
the burden of persuading the Board that an "anti-union animus" was a moti-
vating factor in the employer's decision to discharge or otherwise discriminate
against the employee.2 7 If the General Counsel carries this burden, and the
employer does not succeed in rebutting it, the employer can still avoid liability
by producing a preponderance of the evidence showing "that the employee
would have lost his job in any event." '28 The Court noted that the second part
of this analysis amounts to an affirmative defense, which places the burden of
proof on the employer.2 9 If the employer fails to carry its burden on this issue
the employer is guilty of an unfair labor practice and is subject to the proper
remedies, including reinstatement.3"
The Court affirmed the Board order, and thus adopted the Wright Line
test, on the grounds that it was fair, consistent with the relevant provisions and
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1088.
21. Transportation Management, 103 S. Ct. at 2472.
22. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 674 F.2d 130, 131-32 (1982)
(per curiam), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2469 (1983).
23. NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899, 904 (1st Cir. 1981).
24. Transportation Management, 674 F.2d at 131.
25. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct. 372 (1982).
26. 103 S. Ct. at 2475.
27. Id. at 2474.
28. Id. at 2473.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2474. The only change that the Supreme Court made in the Wright
Line test was to require "a preponderance of the evidence" standard for the General
Counsel and the employer in meeting their burdens of proof. Id. at 2473. The Board
had referred to the General Counsel making a "prima facie showing," and the em-
ployer "demonstrating." Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089.
1984]
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policies of the NLRA, and consistent with analyses that the Court had devel-
oped in analogous areas. 3' First, the Court found the Board's construction of
section 8(a)(3), which required the General Counsel to show only that a dis-
charge was in any way motivated by a desire to frustrate union activity,
"plainly rational and acceptable."32 The Court rejected the court of appeal's
finding that the second part of the analysis constituted an impermissible shift-
ing of the burden under section 10(c) of the NLRA.33 While conceding that
under section 10(c) the General Counsel must bear the burden of persuasion
by a preponderance of the evidence as to all elements of the unfair labor prac-
tice, the Court felt this posed no problem because the unfair labor practice
consists simply of a finding that the employee's protected conduct is a "sub-
stantial or motivating factor" in the discharge.34 Though the Board allowed
the employer to avoid being found a violator by showing he would have dis-
charged the employee anyway, this does not add to the elements of the offense
which the General Counsel has to prove.35 As a result, the Court found the
Board's allocation of the burden of proof to the employer in the second part of
the analysis "clearly reasonable."3 6 The Court bolstered its finding that the
Board's allocation of the burden of proof was correct by finding that the anal-
ogy that the Board drew to Mount Healthy City Board of Education v.
Doyle37 was fair.38
The Court's opinion in Transportation Management resolves a dispute
among the circuits as to the acceptability of the Wright Line analysis of dual
motivation cases. 39 Whether this decision actually serves the policies underly-
31. Transportation Management, 103 S. Ct. at 2474-75.
32. Id. at 2472-73.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
34. 103 S. Ct. at 2474.
35. Id.; see notes 65-69 and accompanying text infra.
36. Id. at 2475.
37. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
38. Transportation Management, 103 S. Ct. at 2475.
39. The First Circuit agreed with the Board's adoption of what it saw to be a
"but for" causation test, but disagreed with the shifting of the burden of proof. Wright
Line, 662 F.2d at 903-04.
The Second Circuit also disagreed with the Board's shifting of the burden of proof,
observing that "shifting the burden of persuasion to the employer frustrates the balance
between employer and employee rights struck in the act." NLRB v. New York Univ.
Medical Center, 702 F.2d 284, 292 (2d Cir. 1983). The Second Circuit felt that the
Board was establishing too high a standard of proof for the employer. The court rea-
soned that shifting the burden of persuasion violated the § 10(c) requirement that the
Board prove an unfair labor practice, and the Board's regulations that impose the bur-
den of persuasion on the Board's attorney in such cases. Id. at 293-94. In effect, this
court saw the question of whether the employee would have been disciplined in the
absence of the anti-union animus as an element of the unfair labor practice. The court
produced additional support for its decision by quoting from the Administrative Proce-
dure Act: "[E]except as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or order
has the burden of proof." 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1982). The court essentially saw the
procedural shift of the burden of persuasion as an unfair lessening of the "but for"
626, [Vol. 49
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ing the NLRA, as outlined in earlier decisions in the same area,0 is questiona-
ble.41 By upholding the Board's test, though, this decision does bring about the
uniformity of analysis and predictability which the Board sought to promote
when it first formulated the test in Wright Line.42
causation test. 702 F.2d at 294.
The Third Circuit voiced similar objections in Behring Int'l v. NLRB, 675 F.2d
83, 84, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1982). The court thought that a more appropriate test was set
forth in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), which
advocated a shift in the burden of production instead of persuasion. 675 F.2d at 88-89;
see Player, The Nature of Defendant's Burden in Title VII Disparate Treatment
Cases, 49 Mo. L. REv. 17, 17, 26-30 (1984).
The Fourth Circuit, in NLRB v. Burns Motor Freight, 635 F.2d 312 (4th Cir.
1980), declined to specifically take a position on the Wright Line test, but seemed to be
more in line with the First, Second and Third circuits in requiring that the Board show
that the discharges were improperly motivated. Id. at 314-15.
The Fifth Circuit has endorsed the Wright Line test. See Red Ball Motor Freight
Inc. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 626, 627-28 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 997
(1982); NLRB v. Charles H. McCauley Assocs., Inc., 657 F.2d 685, 688 (5th Cir.
1981); NLRB v. Robin Am. Corp., 654 F.2d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1981).
The Sixth Circuit has cited the Wright Line test in several cases, but it is unclear
whether the court uses Wright Line, or a dominant-motive test. See Charge Card Ass'n
v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 272, 275 (6th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp., 651 F.2d 436, 437-38 (6th Cir. 1981). But see NLRB v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing
Co., 651 F.2d 442, 446 (6th Cir. 1981) (used Wright Line test).
The Seventh Circuit initially adopted the Wright Line analysis, in Peavey Co. v.
NLRB, 648 F.2d 460, 461 (7th Cir. 1981), then it recognized the analysis offered by
the Third Circuit in Behring, which criticized the shifting of the burden to the em-
ployer. NLRB v. Webb Ford, Inc., 689 F.2d 733, 739 (7th Cir. 1982).
The Eighth Circuit once approved the Wright Line test. NLRB v. Senftner Volk-
swagen Corp., 681 F.2d 557, 560 (8th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Fixtures Mfg. Corp., 669
F.2d 547, 550 (8th Cir. 1982). Then, in NLRB v. Alumna Ceramics Inc., 690 F.2d
136, 138 (8th Cir. 1982), the court returned to its pre-Wright Line "but for" test, as
set out in Mead & Mount Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 1154, 1157 (8th Cir. 1969).
The Ninth Circuit gave the Wright Line test strong support in Doug Hartley, Inc.
v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 579, 580-81 (9th Cir. 1982) and NLRB v. Nevis Indus., 647 F.2d
905, 909 (9th Cir. 1981). Unlike the Seventh and Eighth circuits, the court stayed with
the rule in later cases. See, e.g., Zurn Indus. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1982).
The Tenth Circuit was indecisive on whether the Wright Line test was correct. See
NLRB v. Carbonex Coal Co.. 679 F.2d 200, 203 (10th Cir. 1982).
The Eleventh Circuit declined to specifically comment on the Wright Line test, yet
seemed to reject it by stating that regardless of who had the burden of producing evi-
dence, the General Counsel had the burden of proving that the illegal motive caused
the action taken. See Weather Tamer, Inc. v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 483, 491 n.4 (11th Cir.
1982).
40. See, e.g., First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674
(1981); NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967); American Ship
Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278
(1965); NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 23 (1964); NLRB v. Erie Resis-
tor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 234 (1963); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17
(1954); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
41. See notes 70-83 and accompanying text infra.
42. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089 ("[W]e believe that this test will pro-
1984]
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In the past, the Board applied the "in part" rule to dual motive discharge
cases.4 3 Under this rule, as long as union involvement was a reason for the
discharge, a violation would be found.44 Proof of dominant or controlling law-
ful motives was immaterial, so long as an unlawful motive also existed. 4" The
Board used this rule until it decided Wright Line in 1980. 4 6 Concurrent with
development of the "in part" rule, some court and Board decisions undercut its
impact by allowing the employer to escape reinstating the discharged em-
ployee if it could show that legal motives in fact controlled its decision. 47
The "in part" test, though used exclusively by the Board, fell into disfavor
in several circuits.4" As each circuit developed its own test, confusion and con-
flict between the circuits resulted. 49 The most popular test adopted was the
vide . . . a uniform test to be applied in these 8(a)(3) cases.").
43. Transportation Management, 103 S. Ct. at 2472-73. Almost immediately
after passage of the Wagner Act, which contained the predecessor of § 8(a)(3), in
Consumer's Research, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 57 (1936), the Board rejected the employer's
argument that proof of a legitimate motive established the lawfulness of the discharge.
The Board interpreted the Act as not requiring a showing that the alleged motive was
the sole motive. Id. at 73. Then, in The Louisville Refining Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 844
(1938), modified and enforced, 102 F.2d 678 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 568
(1939), the Board further articulated the test and held that so long as an anti-union
animus was a definite factor, a violation of § 8(a)(3) is established, despite the fact
that other factors also existed. Id. at 861. Many subsequent cases agreed and the rule
came to be that the employer was guilty of a § 8(a)(3) violation if his conduct was
motivated "in whole or in part" by an anti-union animus. See United Dredging Co., 30
N.L.R.B. 739 (1941); Walter Stover, 15 N.L.R.B 635, 642 (1939), enforced as modi-
fied, 114 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1940).
44. As early as 1938 (only three years after its creation), the Board had devel-
oped the in-part rule: "Where the employer has discharged an employee for two or
more reasons and one of them is union affiliation or activity, the Board has found a
violation." 3 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 70 (1938). Thus formulated, the test was simply an
inquiry as to whether an anti-union animus played a part in an employer's decision to
discharge an employee; if so, a violation of section 8(a)(3) was proven. Wright Line,
251 N.L.R.B. at 1084.
45. United Dredging Co., 30 N.L.R.B. 739 (1941); The Dow Chemical Co., 13
N.L.R.B. 993, 1023 (1939) (even where lawful motives are shown to be controlling,
proof of such motives is immaterial where an anti-union motive is also found), enforced
in relevant part, 117 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1941).
46. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B at 1084; see Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp.
Ass'n, 224 N.L.R.B. 574, 575 (1976) (using "in part" test).
47. In NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304
U.S. 576 (1938), the court accepted the employer's argument that proof that the dis-
charge would have taken place absent the illegal motive was relevant to and would
defeat a remedy of reinstatement where a violation had otherwise been found. Never-
theless, the court made clear that the burden of proof on this issue was on the em-
ployer. Id. at 872. In Eagle-Pitcher Mining & Smelting Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 727 (1939),
enforced and modified, 119 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1941), the Board treated such a show-
ing as an affirmative defense which, if proved, would altogether avoid a finding of a
violation.
48. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1084 ("In recent years, various courts of ap-
peals have become increasingly critical of the 'in part' analysis.").
49. Some appellate courts adopted the "in part" test. See, e.g., M.S.P. Indus. v.
6
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"dominant motive" test,50 which required the General Counsel to prove that
the anti-union or anti-protected activity motive was the dominant reason for
the discharge.51 A "but for" test was also commonly used. 2
To alleviate this confusion, the Board in Wright Line borrowed the Mt.
Healthy test, which it hoped wouldallow "room for accommodation and clari-
fication" among the varied approaches of the circuits. 53 The Wright Line-Mt.
Healthy test represented a departure from the "in part" test. It allowed an
employer to escape liability if it could prove that even though there was, in
part, an illegal motive, there also were sufficient legal motives which would
have led to the discharge absent the illegal motive.54 Nevertheless, the Wright
Line test was rejected by many of the circuits,55 thus perpetuating the confu-
NLRB, 568 F.2d 166, 173 (10th Cir. 1977). Some courts used a "but for" test. See
NLRB v. Anchorage Times Publishing Co., 637 F.2d 1359, 1366-69 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981); Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587
F.2d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1978). The Fifth Circuit appears to have followed a "reasonably
equal" standard, NLRB v. Aero Corp., 581 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1978). A few
courts followed both a "but for" test and a "dominant motive" test. Compare Lippin-
cott Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 661 F.2d 112, 115 (9th Cir. 1981) ("but for") with NLRB
v. Int'l Medication Sys., Ltd., 640 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 1981) (dominant motive),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982). The Seventh Circuit asked whether the illegal
motive contributed in a "significant way" to the employer's conduct. NLRB v. Pfizer,
Inc., 629 F.2d 1272, 1275, 1277 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). The foregoing are only
representative of the varied pre-Wright Line analyses used by the courts. See generally
Kelly, supra note 11, at 874-79.
50. Kelly, supra note 11, at 875.
51. See NLRB v. Int'l Medication Sys., Ltd., 640 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.
1981); Western Exterminators Co. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1114, 1118 (9th Cr. 1977).
52. Under the "but for" test, the General Counsel would have to prove that
illegal motive was a cause for the employer's action without which he would not have
acted. Analytically, this test differs from a "dominant motive" test, though, in that a
"but for" motive could actually play a relatively minor, as opposed to dominant, role in
the employer's decision making process. See Kelly, supra note 11, at 874-75.
53. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1086. Mt. Healthy involved a refusal to re-
hire an untenured teacher. The school board gave two reasons for the "discharge": (1)
use of obscene language and gestures in the school cafeteria; and (2) an unauthorized
communication to a radio station of a change in school policy. Since the Court found
the second reason to concern an activity protected by the first and fourteenth amend-
ments, and since the first reason appeared to be a legitimate ground for dismissal, this
case represents a true "dual motive" situation. The Court formulated the test that the
Board later relied on in Wright Line:
Initially, in this case, the burden was properly placed upon . . . [the em-
ployee] to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that this
conduct was a "substantial factor"-or, to put it in other words, that it was a
"motivating factor" in the [School] Board's decision not to rehire him. ...
[H]aving carried that burden, however, the District Court should have gone
on to determine whether the Board had shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to respondent's re-
employment even in the absence of the protected conduct.
429 U.S. at 287, quoted in Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1086-87.
54. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1087.
55. See note 39 infra.
1984]
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sion. While most courts agreed with the Board's adoption of what amounted
substantively to a "but for" test of causation on the motivation issue,56 many
disagreed with the Board's shifting of the burden of persuasion to the em-
ployer to prove that it would have discharged the employee anyway.57 The
Supreme Court's decision in Transportation Management resolved the split
among the circuits by adopting the Board's Wright Line test.
The primary effect of the Court's decision is to set out a standard analysis
for section 8(a)(3) dual motive cases. This in itself is an improvement over the
prior confused state of the law. Transportation Management establishes ex-
actly what the General Counsel must prove to establish a violation, and simi-
larly what the defendant employer must prove to avoid a violation. 8
First, the Court makes it clear that the General Counsel bears the burden
of proving the violation. 9 Because an unfair labor practice consists of adverse
action against an employee based on an "anti-union" animus, the General
Counsel must prove that the anti-union animus was a "substantial or motivat-
ing factor" in the decision to take action against the employee.60 It is not
entirely clear what constitutes a "substantial or motivating" factor, but since
the Court's decision represents an endorsement of the Board rule in Wright
Line,"' it is quite likely that the Court also intended to adopt the Board's defi-
nition of a "motivating factor." In Wright Line, the Board indicated that it
was only necessary to prove that the unlawful cause was "causally related to
the employer action." 2 The words "substantial and motivating factor" would
then seem to in reality indicate an "in part" causation burden.63 Thus, the
General Counsel's burden in a section 8(a)(3) dual motivation case is simply
56. Behring Int'l, Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 83, 84 (3d Cir. 1982); NLRB v.
Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899, 903 (1st Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co.,
651 F.2d 442, 446 (6th Cir. 1981).
57. See, e.g., Behring, 675 F.2d at 84; Wright Line, 662 F.2d at 905.
58. While there is no doubt as to the analysis established by Transportation
Management, there are problems reconciling this analysis with traditional unfair labor
practice modes of analysis.
59. Transportation Management, 103 S. Ct. at 2474.
60. Id.
61. See text accompanying notes 23-28 supra.
62. 251 N.L.R.B at 1089 n.14.
63. In Wright Line, the Board rid itself of the "in part" language in order to
clear the air, yet asserted that in so doing they were not repudiating the established
principles which they had applied in the past. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089. The modification
was, then, actually nothing but a change in terminology. The Supreme Court recog-
nized that the Board had merely been trying to "restate its analysis in a way more
acceptable to the Courts of Appeals" in order to gain wider acceptance and enforce-
ment of its decisions by those courts. Transportation Management, 103 S. Ct. at 2473.
The Court recognized that there was no substantive difference, as is evidenced in the
opinion when, after discussing the Board's "in part" test, the Court stated "or as the
Board now puts it, that the employer's conduct was a substantial or motivating factor
in the adverse action," thus inferring that it is the same test, now traveling under a
different name. Id. at 2474.
[Vol. 49630
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to prove by a preponderance of the evidencee that the defendant employer's
"anti-union animus" was an "in part" cause of the adverse action taken
against the employee.
Once the General Counsel meets its burden, the violation is established
unless the employer can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he
would have taken the same action absent his anti-union animus.6 5 The Court
recognized the Board's characterization of this proof as an affirmative de-
fense.66 Because it is an affirmative defense, the employer must sustain the
burden of proof. 67 The employer's attempted proof on this issue, then, has
nothing to do with the actual elements of a violation. Rather, it allows the
employer to avoid the violation68 by making a hypothetical proof that he would
still have fired the employee absent the illegal motive. If he is unsuccessful, a
violation is found.6 9
The Supreme Court's ratification of the Wright Line test breaks with the
traditional mode of analysis which it outlined in earlier cases.7 0 By adopting
this test, the Court sacrificed to some extent much precedent favoring a
"weighing and balancing" approach to all labor cases under the NLRA. In
any labor case, "the ultimate problem is the balancing of the conficting legiti-
mate interests. . . .[S]triking that balance to effectuate national labor policy
is often a difficult and delicate responsibility. . . ."7 The Wright Line-Trans-
portation Management test reformulates historically sound labor law princi-
ples, such as the "in part" test, into a formulaic causation test which slights
the basic labor law policy approach of balancing conflicting legitimate inter-
ests. Prior to Transportation Management, in NLRB v. Great Dane Trail-
ers, 7 2 the Court proposed its comprehensive rule in such cases, based on a
64. "Preponderance of the evidence" is the standard of proof recognized for
these cases by the Court in Transportation Management as the standard prescribed by
§ 10(c) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982). Transportation Management, 103
S. Ct. at 2474.
65. The Court stated that the Board's recognition of the employer's right to
avoid being adjudicated a violator "does not change or add to the elements of the
unfair labor practice that the General Counsel has the burden of proving under §
10(c)." Transportation Management, 103 S. Ct. at 2474 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 2473-75.
67. Id. at 2475.
68. Id. at 2473.
69. The employer also bears the risk of non-persuasion. As the Court stated:
The employer is a wrongdoer: he has acted out of a motive that is declared
illegitimate by the statute. It is fair that he bear the risk that the influence of
legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, because he knowingly created
the risk and because the risk was created not by innocent activity, but by his
own wrongdoing.
Transportation Management, 103 S. Ct. at 2475.
70. See generally Jackson & Heller, The Irrelevance of the Wright Line De-
bate: Returning to the Realism of Erie Resistor in Unfair Labor Practice Cases, 77
Nw. U.L. REv. 737 (1983).
71. NLRB v. Truck Driver's Local Union 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957).
72. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
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synthesis of its earlier decisions on the subject. 3 Recognizing that section
8(a)(3) violations normally turned on whether the discriminatory conduct was
motivated by an anti-union purpose, the court focused its attention on motive
analysis7 4 and devised "several principles of controlling importance. '75 First, if
the employer's conduct is inherently destructive of important employee rights,
no proof of an anti-union animus is necessary, and the Board can find an un-
fair labor practice, even if the employer produces evidence of legitimate busi-
ness reasons for the action. Second, if the adverse effect of employer's conduct
is "comparatively slight," and if the employer has produced evidence of a valid
business justification, an anti-union animus must be proved to sustain the un-
fair labor practice charge.76 The Great Dane test allows the Board to explicitly
consider the degree to which the employer activity interferes with employee
rights in comparison with the validity of the employer's asserted business
justification.
In Erie Resistor Co. v. NLRB,77 one of the cases which the Great Dane
Court relied on, the Court stated that rather than untangling motives, what
really had to be done was to balance the employee interests against the em-
ployer interests "in the light of the Act and its policy. '78 The Erie Resistor
decision indicates that this balancing must be done with consideration as to
the effect which the particular action will have on employee rights, as opposed
to the effect on the employer if it is not allowed to deal with its employees as it
sees fit.7 9
These principles, from Great Dane and Erie Resistor,8" indicate that the
focus should not be exclusively on the anti-union animus. Rather, all necessary
elements of a section 8(a)(3) violation, most importantly the effect that the
alleged discriminatory action would have on union organization, should be
considered. Since this issue would be a question of fact, the finder of fact
would have a great deal of discretion in deciding the case. This allowance of
discretion, in turn, reflected the Supreme Court's desire to allow balancing of
the interests involved, and its recognition of the Board's "duty to strike the
73. Id. at 32.
74. Id. at 33-34.
75. Id. at 34.
76. Id. at 34.
77. 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
78. Id. at 228-29.
79. Id.
[S]uch situations [dual motive cases] present a complex of motives and pre-
ferring one motive to another is in reality the far more delicate task . . . of
weighting the interests of employees in concerted activity against the interest
of the employer in operating his business in a particular manner and of bal-
ancing in the light of the Act and its policy the intended consequences upon
employee rights against the business ends to be served by the employer's
conduct.
80. The Great Dane and Erie Resistor decisions actually represent the teach-
ings of a long line of cases, as the Erie Resistor Court acknowledged. 373 U.S. at 230.
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proper balance between the asserted business justifications and the invasion of
employee rights in light of the Act and its policy." 8' In short, while analysis of
the specific causal role of the employer's anti-union animus is an important
factor, it is neither decisive nor necessary.
While the Board alluded to balancing interests, 2 the test adopted in
Wright Line does not suit itself to a balancing analysis. Because the Supreme
Court adopted this test, all future section 8(a)(3) cases will turn solely on the
questions of whether the employer action was caused in part by an anti-union
animus and whether it would have been taken in the absence of such animus.
In light of the historical method of analysis in this area, this inquiry is too
narrow and single-minded as it allows very little room for balancing interests.
Rather, it is strictly a causation standard with a procedural shift in the burden
of persuasion. 3 According to this test, the Board, or an enforcing court, can-
not consider the degree to which the employer action discourages the protected
activity. It also does not allow consideration of how important or how valid the
employer's business interests are, but merely whether there were business jus-
tifications which would have caused the action in any event. It is plausible that
in situations where the employee rights are invaded to a great degree, or em-
ployer rights are an overriding concern, the Transportation Management test
would not allow consideration of such factors. Insofar as this test focuses de-
terminations of section 8(a)(3) dual motive cases solely on the result of such a
motive-causation analysis, it appears to conflict with a long line of precedent
and the general labor law policy of balancing interests which culminated in
the Erie Resistor and Great Dane decisions.
In the Transportation Management decision the Supreme Court adopted
a two-part test upon which section 8(a)(3) dual motive discharge cases are to
be decided. By adopting this test, the Court brings much needed uniformity of
analysis to the area. This uniformity, though, comes at a cost. By setting forth
this test as the test to be used, without discussing its relationship to the analy-
sis for such cases as developed in earlier Supreme Court decisions, the Court
has narrowed the analysis too much. The Wright Line-Transportation Man-
agement test focuses the whole analysis on a determination of motive and cau-
sation, whereas historically this determination was only one factor, albeit an
important one, in an approach which weighed and balanced the interests of
both the employee and the employer.
MICHAEL J. MARSHALL
81. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. at 96.
82. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1083, 1088.
83. See notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
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